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Abstract This article states the conclusions of major field research into the impact of Chinese public and
private economic activity on governance in Africa. China has gone into parts of Africa and sectors of African
activity where Western actors have been reluctant to venture, yet receives criticism for not reaching
standards of governance which the West itself is not able to apply. The Chinese go into Africa on a basis of
equality and partnership but are unclear how to impose standards of conduct which are not integral to a
consensual relationship or how to guide the development of standards which they do not have at home.
China is itself engaging in a continuing process of economic reform and increasing privatisation.
Nonetheless, it has developed a doctrine of effective governance in Africa which stresses responsibility and
accountability, provision of basic services and social stability, a central Chinese objective at home and abroad.
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1 Introduction
We have seen the increasing engagements of
rising powers in Africa. The role of China in
international development has risen to
prominence in recent years. The objective of this
study is to identify and evaluate the implications
of China’s emerging role for governance and
development in states experiencing ‘fragile’
socioeconomic and political conditions in sub-
Saharan Africa. The article’s primary focus is on
understanding better and explaining the drivers
behind China’s growing presence in this region,
and makes reference to Rwanda and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).
2 China’s domestic dynamics and its external
activities
China’s domestic and external development
experiences are interrelated. China’s approach to
governance is closely linked to its own
development experience, illustrated by slogans
such as ‘Development first, governance second’,
‘Unleash people’s potential’, and ‘If the water is
too clear, no fish can be found’. China’s foreign aid
is largely based on the requests of recipients. This
means three things. The first is that China rarely
goes to the recipient on its own initiative to design
aid projects, besides some landmark ones. After
China receives these requests from the recipients,
there is certainly an internal evaluation process
about whether to provide aid and how to carry it
out. If the projects are related to concessional
loans, the EximBank will take the responsibility to
make the evaluation. It also seems likely that
China’s budget constraint on aid is very strict, and
is therefore often unable to meet the request of
the recipient. According to the authors’
interviews, the officials of the Ministry of
Commerce (MOFCOM) often have complaints on
several issues. On the one hand, the size of
China’s aid is quite small. So some officials feel it
is very strange that the West wants to cooperate
with China because China certainly provides less
aid than many Western countries. On the other
hand, they are also short of personnel to manage
the existing aid projects. China’s rapid economic
growth has resulted in the domestic salary and
living standards improving at tremendous speed
while the standard of compensation from the
government for people who go abroad to work on
aid projects has not been improved accordingly for
a long time. Thus, it has become more and more
difficult for MOFCOM to mobilise human
resources.1
China’s foreign aid, moreover, cannot be
completely understood through a ‘rational’
process. This does not mean there is not
rationality behind China’s aid but that as some
MOFCOM officials put it, compared with the
West, China’s foreign aid certainly lacks a long-
term strategy. One MOFCOM official argued
that China’s aid is not as complicated as the
West cares to believe. From this official’s
understanding, they simply do what they can for
recipients according to the budget. It has also
been heard that the EximBank also complains
about the limited government funds available to
them. If the government can raise the scale of
aid, more concessional loans may be provided for
proper projects. Thus, it seems that MOFCOM
and the EximBank do not positively design
China’s aid according to some specific strategy
or purpose but only do what they can do with the
current budget constraint.2 Some have claimed
that the financing is achieved for policy-related
purposes where funding is applied for from the
Ministry of Finance. In fact, this process is in
actuality quite similar to China’s governmental
budget as a whole. The government’s spending
does not depend on a rational budget and the tax
collected according to it, but it simply spends
how much it can collect.
It is very difficult to argue, in governance terms,
that China’s foreign aid is based on any clear
strategy. Overall, China provides foreign aid
mainly based on the so-called ‘friendship’ between
China and its recipient countries in the Chinese
discourse and the aid is political rather than
developmental in nature. Although under the
impact of the Western development discourse
China has begun to use the term ‘international
development cooperation’ more and more often,
most people still think about aid as primarily
political. But it is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
rather than MOFCOM that deals with China’s
strategic plan and diplomatic policies. For this
reason we often hear complaints from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding MOFCOM’s
aid programmes.3 Recently, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs established its new department of
international economy. Currently this domestic
institutional dilemma remains unsolved and it
shall be interesting to see how it is resolved.
From the recipients’ perspective, China’s foreign
aid is generally welcomed for two reasons. The
first is that China’s aid is based on the principle of
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non-interference and without political conditions.
This essentially gives the recipients more
bargaining power when they negotiate with China
on aid projects. Secondly, the differences between
China’s foreign aid and Western aid provide
alternatives for recipient countries and give them
more choice; this is especially the case in Africa.
The DRC and China, for example, have an
agreement signed in 2008, the Convention relating
to the development of mining and infrastructure
projects in the DRC. This agreement formed the
basis for a joint venture, named Sicomines,
between one Congolese company on behalf of the
DRC state and two Chinese firms designed to
implement the agreement and get the projects
into place. Here, the DRC gains valuable
infrastructure through Chinese funding and
project expertise provided by the agreement and
the Chinese parties are reimbursed through the
joint venture’s returns and production outputs.
Generally speaking, within the whole
implementation mechanism of China’s foreign
aid, the decision-making process is still a black
box. We still lack detailed information on topics
like the negotiation process between the Chinese
government and recipients, the interaction
between MOFCOM, the Ministry of Finance and
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the
operational procedure between MOFCOM and
other organs of implementation. This kind of
information cannot be obtained through
interviews because Chinese government officials
are quite sensitive about these topics.
3 Conceptual framework
The article works through two key concepts:
‘governance’ and ‘fragile states’:
(a) Governance
Within Western academic and, to a significant
extent, policy circles, the key pillars of
governance are reasonably well established, even
if the actual content is often contested. In
summary, there are four central elements within
what may be loosely termed ‘a’ Western
perspective: authority, reciprocity, trust and
accountability. Authority refers to ‘legitimate
power’, rather than the exercise of arbitrary
power undermining the public sphere, and
alienation or rejection by the citizenry. Reciprocity
is ‘a form of social interaction that generates
new forms of consensus about basic rules of
politics’ and is based on ‘future expectations of
returns’. Trust refers to trust between families
and kinship groups, but also to ‘impersonal trust
between different groupings and towards public
authorities’. Finally, accountability refers to ‘the
responsiveness of public authorities towards
citizens and the extent to which citizens can hold
public authorities to account’ (Kjær 2004: 164).
As categories, each of these constitutive
elements is held to have a universal applicability
and, in principle, are central to the Western
Powers’ approach to the promotion of
governance in sub-Saharan African states and to
the ‘reconstruction’ of states regarded as fragile.
(b) Fragile states
A widely used definition of fragile states is that:
‘States are fragile when state structures lack
political will and/or capacity to provide the basic
functions needed for poverty reduction,
development and to safeguard the security and
human rights of their populations’ (OECD
2007). However, it is important to engage with
Putzel’s argument that there needs to be greater
definitional clarity regarding the term ‘fragile
states’:
At the core of the problematic definition of
state fragility used by the international
development community is a misguided belief
that the institutional practices of advanced
democracies and developed economies need to
be transferred all at once to the poorest
countries. There is also a resistance to
identifying that some of the practices which
states use to achieve peace and stability –
state resilience – violate precepts of market
liberalism and notions of good governance
(2010: 4).
China’s engagement with Africa has often been
reduced to an issue of exacerbating existing
governance issues, which is seen by some as an
extension of China’s own lack of concern for
human rights and accountability at home (Alden
2007). Hence, we need to understand the
relational dynamics of Chinese and African
political brokerage. Sketchily, we know that these
relations are essentially between elites (Carmody
and Taylor 2010) and that they create
unaccountable enclaves within states such as
Angola (Power, Mohan and Tan-Mullins 2012;
Corkin 2011). While these elite relations
engender projects that deliver infrastructure
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(Foster, Butterfield, Chuan and Pushak 2008)
and produce resource rents, it is unclear how far
these are developmental.
4 Chinese understanding and approach to
‘governance’ and ‘fragile states’
To distil China’s rapidly evolving approach to
governance down to a few basic facets is,
naturally, challenging. However, based on
extensive author interviews and secondary
research in China and Africa, there are five key
aspects that come to the fore:
z China’s approach to governance is very much linked to
its own development experience. China views
concepts such as transparency, participation
and the rule of law as ethnocentric Western
norms. Rather than talking of ‘good
governance’, China focuses on ‘effective
governance’, building real capacities, and
pragmatic engagement with partners on the
ground that will lead to long-term partnerships
that are mutually beneficial. China’s view is
that overcoming state fragility requires state
resilience, without which effective governance
cannot be reached. For the immediate future,
China’s conception of governance will remain
different from that of the West.
z Despite Chinese government policy to encourage
overseas investment by Chinese firms and their
perception that this offers a ‘win-win’ strategy for
Africa, links between Chinese government policy and
business sector firms are in practice relatively weak.
The Chinese officials and academics
interviewed concur in the view that these
relationships are currently fluid. Consequently,
there are spaces and opportunities for China’s
public and private sectors to build constructive
relationships that contribute to both Chinese
and African development goals.
z China does not seek to shape African states in its own
image or interfere in politics, but it is realising that it
cannot simply pretend that the problems of its local
partners do not exist, or are exclusively the concerns of
those countries. As its investments in fragile
states grows, China has become increasingly
interested in the ways in which the West has
tried to handle African problems in the past
and is opening up to the idea of dialogue with
Western and non-Western donors and
international agencies. This bodes well for
efforts to bring China into initiatives such as
the Extractive Industry Transparency
Initiative and the Equator Principles.
z China is in Africa for business, it is not in Africa to
improve African governance. That is a Western way of
thinking. China views African development as
dependent on Africans, not outside partners. While
China’s engagement with African countries
provides for many of the conditions they need
to develop (investment, infrastructure,
opening new markets, better prices for African
products, and so forth), China’s developmental
impact will depend on how African leaders
operate the relationship. Fragile states must
create a conducive policy environment for
investment, promote local investment in joint
ventures, and train African entrepreneurs so
that skills and technology can be transferred.
Thus, getting basic governance right is
necessary for African countries to make the
most of their relationships with China.
z Within the field of development cooperation, the
growth in weight and influence of China is clear.
However, at present, China is at the ‘crossroads’ in
trying to work out how to use its rapidly growing
power and is in the process of defining its core overseas
national interests. Hence, how to communicate
with the outside world and to be understood
better is very important for China, and it is
also very important to the traditional OECD
donors and African countries.
The first point to make in explaining
‘governance’ in the Chinese context is that it is a
concept that is gaining increasing attention and
serious intellectual and policy deliberation.
Effective ‘governance’ is, in Chinese usage,
synonymous with a strong state and efficient
public administration that gains legitimacy and
public support through the quality of its
authority, reciprocity, trust and accountability
grounded in an appeal to a national future. All
these elements transfer readily to Chinese
perceptions of African governance. The basic
premise of governance is the primacy of
economic development (Chen and Li 2011: 56).
Therefore, these authors emphasise that
economic development is of overriding
importance for governance (ibid.). Li and Xu
argue that the most significant factor in fragile
states is that of a failure of effective output (Li
and Xu 2010: 51). The potential for disaster and
chaos, they suggest, spilling over to neighbouring
countries would not only cause a serious
humanitarian crisis, but also pose a grave
challenge to international order because of the
multinational criminals and terrorist groups
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seeking to exploit such fragile conditions. Their
answer to this problem is to support the
processes of improving state resilience through a
strong state administration (Li and Xu 2010: 52;
Zhou 2011).
China’s own emphasis is on state resilience – on
state-building. China’s prerequisite is societal
stability and orderliness inculcated via a strong
state supported by the Communist Party. This is
taken from China’s domestic experience of
transition of a velocity and breadth that is
unprecedented in the modern era. Inevitably,
this attracts criticism. One does not mean this is
a fully self-aware or deliberately conceived
approach to governance by China to be held up
as a model for other developing countries.
Indeed, this is explicitly denied and eschewed
among Chinese development specialists and
foreign policy staff. Nonetheless, the importance
of a strong Chinese state as a ‘developmental
state’ cannot be overlooked in its potential
appeal, especially for fragile states.
Putzel’s argument is that a definition of ‘state
fragility’ that is useful for policy intervention
needs to highlight what distinguishes fragile
states from the rest of low-income developing
countries. This means recognition of the
importance of the achievements of states in
establishing a significant degree of ‘resilience’:
‘The counterpoint to state fragility is not development,
but state resilience, [authors’ emphasis added]
which may be a stepping stone to more dynamic
development, or a plateau marked by economic
stagnation, beyond which it is difficult to pass’
and that there is a ‘huge distance that must be
traversed from both conditions of fragility and
stagnant resilience to a situation where the state
is presiding over accelerated growth and poverty
reduction’ (2010: 2). Nevertheless, state fragility
involves the failure of the rule of law; impotent
state institutions; illegitimate or non-inclusive
government; a weak economy; fragile civil society
and a vulnerable environment (France
Cooperation 2007: 3).
Attaining these basic functional attributes in the
case of China has, clearly, been a long, bitter and
often bloody experience and a sense of national
vulnerability remains embedded in the political
culture, discourse and political practice
domestically and internationally, ‘China’s rise’
notwithstanding. As a consequence, the Chinese
government is reluctant to proselytise publicly to
fragile states. While Western governments,
including the UK, suspended their official
development assistance (ODA) to Rwanda in
July 2012 because of allegations of it giving
covert support to rebels in Eastern DRC, China
has not followed suit.
5 China and Rwanda
China’s engagement in Rwanda is driven mainly
by its need for natural resources, political
support and access to consumer markets.
Although Rwanda has nowhere near the amount
of natural resources as other fragile states such
as the DRC, the political support it offers for the
‘One China’ policy as well as to China as a
responsible stakeholder in multilateral fora is
valuable. For Rwanda, China is an attractive
source of investment and aid because it provides
an alternative to traditional donors, which
increases the countries’ negotiating options in
order to maximise assistance. China’s system of
state capitalism also allows it to make longer-
term commitments and take on building large
infrastructure projects at lower costs.
Rwanda has had much more success in managing
Chinese involvement in line with its national
interests. Since the genocide, Rwanda has
strengthened its government, implemented
wide-ranging reforms to attract investment, and
elaborated ‘Vision 2020’, its national
development strategy. In 2011 Rwanda was the
second fastest growing economy in sub-Saharan
Africa. In the last few years, Rwanda’s trade with
China has grown faster than with any of its other
partners, doubling from 2009 to 2012 to reach a
value of $US160 million.
Rwanda has proactively facilitated investment
and trade with China by including Rwandan
business people in its official delegations to
China and establishing a Rwanda Development
Board office in Shenzhen, which promotes
opportunities and advises the Rwandan
government on policies that will encourage
Chinese investment. Contrary to popular views,
most of China’s investments are not in the
natural resources sector, but in transformative
sectors like telecommunications and
manufacturing. Rwanda has particularly
targeted information and communications
technology (ICT) as a sector where China can
help it become a regional leader. It has engaged
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Chinese enterprises such as ZTE and Huawei to
provide equipment and transfer expertise in
order to upgrade technology, enhance
e-governance programmes, and establish a new
ICT Park in Kigali. Through its diplomatic
engagement with China, Rwanda has also been
approved as an official tourist destination for
Chinese citizens as well as tariff-free access to
China for 95 per cent of its exports.
When Rwanda was accused of supporting the
M23 rebel group in the DRC, Western donors
withdrew their aid. However, just as the cuts
were beginning to hurt the economy, China gave
Rwanda US$35 million in interest-free loans and
grants, despite China’s strong support for
Kabila’s government in the DRC. Thus, we can
see that China has not developed a
comprehensive framework for dealing with this
inter-state crisis politically. Its traditional
inclination is to remain outside conflicts for
which it does not have any deep, direct
knowledge and experience. However, as China is
involved in both countries and even contributes
to the peacekeeping mission in the DRC, it will
need to develop a framework for analysis beyond
its philosophy of resilient state development.
Rwanda has welcomed China’s aid, trade and
investment with open arms. In the aftermath of
the 1994 Rwandan genocide, strengthening ties
with China helped Rwanda rebuild and grow
economically. The Chinese Ambassador to
Rwanda, Shu Zhan, said that ‘Rwanda’s ability to
turn itself around after the atrocities of 1994 is a
tremendous achievement in itself which merits
being supported both emotionally and financially’
(Touchot 2012). Rwanda’s relationship with
China has been crucial more recently, as Western
countries suspended aid due to reports that
Rwanda was backing the M23 rebel group in the
DRC. Western countries suspended aid due to
reports that Rwanda was backing the M23 rebel
group in the DRC. As noted above, China’s
US$35 million funding deal came just as the cuts
began to hurt the economy, consisting of
US$19 million as an interest-free loan and
US$16 million in grants (Kagire 2012).
Ambassador Zhan said that China would not
dictate how Rwanda should use the money, and
that ‘China intends to back Rwanda over the next
two years it will hold the UN (Non-Permanent
Security Council) seat’ (ibid.). Thus, since 1971,
Rwanda and China have built a positive and
increasingly strong relationship predicated on
their respective political and economic interests.
Overview of Chinese projects 
Since 1972, China has supported well over 30
projects in Rwanda through the framework of
Economic and Technical Cooperation. Most
projects involve financing and constructing
infrastructure, but there have also been projects
in agriculture, education, health and trade.
In terms of infrastructure, the China Road and
Bridge Corporation (CRBC) has rehabilitated
and built many roads in Rwanda, including the
Kigali Rusumo Highway (162km, completed in
1977), the Parliament House Kininia Road
(3.5km), the Kinyinyia Textile Mill Road
(2.6km), the Rusizi Rubavu Highway (66km at
US$116 million) and the Kigali Genocide
Memorial Centre Road (Ministry of Commerce
2006). The CRBC is the largest Chinese state-
owned construction company in Africa, and has
been working in Rwanda for over 30 years, with
an office in the country (Touchot 2012). In 2009
China provided an interest-free loan to Rwanda
of US$37.8 million, 35 per cent of which was used
to rehabilitate the Kigali road network.
China has also funded construction (1987) and
refurbishment (2005) of the Amahoro National
Stadium, the Prime Holdings conference centre
(2004), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
building (at US$8.6 million) (Ministry of
Commerce 2006). Currently, the Kigali
Convention Centre is being constructed by the
Beijing Construction Engineering Group
(BCEG) at the cost of US$226 million
(MININFRA 2013). In April 2013 the China
State Construction Engineering Corporation
(CSCEC) was awarded the construction contract
for the Bugesera International Airport to the
tune of US$650 million (Ssuuna 2013).
China has offered technical assistance to Rwanda
in agriculture by turning swamps into irrigated
paddy fields in Rwamagana (1982) and Umutara
(2000) (Ministry of Commerce 2006). China has
also supported demonstration and training
initiatives for Village Mechanization Service
Centres at the Kabuye-Kigali central workshop.
In the health sector, China constructed and later
expanded the Kibungo Hospital, built the
Kibungo Medical Training School in 2005, the
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Masaka District Hospital, and has consistently
supported the work of rotating Chinese medical
teams in Rwandan hospitals (Ministry of
Commerce 2006). China has also donated
medical equipment and malaria medicines to
Rwanda, as well as offering support for the
maintenance of medical equipment.
In terms of industry, China built a cement
factory in Western Province that is now run by
CIMERWA (Rwanda’s only domestic cement
producer), which currently has the capacity to
produce 100,000 tonnes of cement per year.
China also constructed a sugar factory at Kabuye
Kigali, the army brick factory, and the
Rwamagana rice-husking factory (Ministry of
Commerce 2006).
As for education, China is obliged to provide
Rwandan students with nine university
scholarships annually, but in practice it has
offered many more than this minimum. In 2012
over 40 Rwandan students received scholarships
to study in China, and 160 Rwandans from
various fields were sent to attend workshops in
China to improve their skills. China built an
agro-veterinary secondary school in Western
Province, a vocational school in Northern
Province, and also established a Confucius
Institute in Kigali to teach Chinese language
and culture. In 2011 the Institute had about
300 students, and was starting to teach Chinese
in some Rwandan high schools. In the future, it
plans to offer courses in universities and primary
schools as well (Magistad 2011).
Chinese investment 
Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in
Rwanda is small-scale, making up less than 1 per
cent of China’s total FDI in Africa. However, from
the Rwandan perspective, it is significant, forming
an average of 5.6 per cent of FDI between 2003
and 2007 (ACET 2009: 24). Chinese FDI flows
were at US$1.4 million in 2005, and rose to
US$12.7 million in 2010. In terms of stock,
investments rose from US$3.3 million in 2004 to
US$41.6 million in 2010. Driving investment are
the positive views of Rwanda as a country that is
determined to protect investors and become a
regional financial hub.
Contrary to popular views, most of China’s
investments are not in the natural resources
sector, but in transformative sectors like
telecommunications and manufacturing.
Between 2000 and 2009, the Rwanda Investment
and Export Promotion Agency registered nine
Chinese investment projects cumulatively worth
about US$46 million (ibid.). This represents
around 4.3 per cent of all registered projects
during that period. These investments were
made by ALink Technologies and Fadar Ltd
(ICT), Star Communications and Huawei
Technologies (telecommunications), LIU Xinen
S.A.R.L., Rwanda Toothpaste Company and Zong
Wang International Leather (manufacturing),
the Great Lakes Refinery (mineral refining) and
the China Rwanda Product Wholesale and
Re-export Promotion Centre (services). These
investments created a considerable number of
jobs, with the re-export centre alone employing
1,000 Rwandans (ACET 2009: 25).
In 2012 two of the top ten investments registered
by the Rwanda Development Board (RDB)
involved China. The largest investment, at
US$162 million, was a joint venture with China
to build a resort outside Kigali called Eagle on
the Lake (Hitimana 2013). The fourth largest
was a US$92 million investment by the Chinese
construction company Century Park Hotels and
Residences Ltd to build a Sheraton Hotel in
Kigali (d’Amour Mbonyinshuti 2013).
The three major challenges Chinese investors face
in Rwanda are communication across Chinese,
English, French and Kinyarwanda, the limited pool
of skilled labour in Rwanda, and sometimes the
difficulty of finding cost-effective access to raw
materials. Still, as John Gara, CEO of the RDB
says, ‘the figures for Chinese FDI are not yet as
high as we would want them to be, but certainly we
are beginning to see interest’ (Namata 2011).
From the Chinese perspective, Li Jinzao, the Vice
Minister of Commerce stated that:
China and Rwanda have good relations.
Chinese companies have been playing an
important role in the economic development
of Rwanda and have undertaken the
construction of roads, electricity facilities and
water supply as well as investment in digital
TV broadcasting in Rwanda. So, our future is
promising (MINAFFET 2013).
Trade between Rwanda and China 
Over the past few years, Rwanda’s trade with
China has grown faster than with any of its other
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trading partners, doubling from 2006 to 2007 and
reaching US$100.8 million in 2008. Between 2004
and 2008, Rwanda’s imports from China grew by
700 per cent (Kariuki, Byusa and Ogunleye 2009)!
By 2010 Rwanda imported more goods from
China than anywhere else in the world, at a value
of US$195.80 million. This represents a share of
15.6 per cent of Rwanda’s overall imports. In the
same year, Rwanda exported US$18.8 million
worth of goods to Hong Kong and US$17.3 million
to China, shares of 8.1 per cent and 7.4 per cent
respectively (National Institute of Statistics 2012).
Although both imports and exports have grown,
Rwanda imports much more from China than it
exports to China, leading to a significant trade
deficit in China’s favour. Rwanda’s imports from
China are primarily electronics, building
materials, shoes, clothes and machines for
manufacturing goods like bricks and tea bags.
China mostly imports things like rawhides, and
minerals from Rwanda. For example, Rwanda
exports 10 per cent of its tin ore (valued at
US$3.8 billion), 42 per cent of its nobium and
tantalum (US$8.2 billion) and 57 per cent of its
tungsten ores (US$10.2 billion) to China
(Malunda and Musana 2012). In 2013 the
Chinese government extended duty-free
treatment to 95 per cent of Rwandan exports. If
Rwandan businesses can figure out how to take
maximal advantage of this and start exporting
more value-added goods, it promises to boost the
competitiveness of goods from Rwanda as well as
the country’s export earnings.
There are a few challenges for trade between
Rwanda and China. The first is the language
barrier. This creates problems of communication
and can also make it difficult to establish trust
between trading partners.4 The Confucius
Institute in Kigali is working on this, by teaching
Rwandans Chinese, as well as providing
opportunities for Chinese business people to
familiarise themselves with Rwandan languages
and culture. China has also launched a campaign
to communicate its business practices and
measures that are in place to facilitate trade. The
Economic and Commercial Counsellor’s Office of
the Chinese Embassy in Rwanda has been involved
in the process of building positive relationships.
Secondly, there is a perception in Rwanda that
many goods from China are unsafe or cheap
because they are of bad quality (Kariuki et al.
2009). In response to this, the Rwanda Bureau of
Standards has been established, but it is still in
its infancy. While China does not take
responsibility for the choices of Rwandans to buy
cheap goods, it does promote Rwandans learning
more about the Chinese goods that are available
by sponsoring their travel to trade fairs in China.
About 100 Rwandans take advantage of this
opportunity each year.
Third, Rwanda’s transport infrastructure poses a
challenge as the country is landlocked and goods
must be brought over long distances on an
inefficient road network to ports in neighbouring
countries. This makes both imports and exports
for Rwanda more expensive.5 While geography
cannot be helped, China has been significantly
involved in upgrading roads, and Rwanda has
plans to build a railroad network that will make
transport easier, cheaper and faster.
A fourth challenge is that it can be difficult for
Rwandan business people to gain entry to
China’s market. This is partly due to language
barriers, but also because the length of
commitments favoured by the Chinese are quite
short, six months being a typical contract term
(Kariuki et al. 2009). This requires Rwandan
business people with limited exposure to
international trade to negotiate contracts
carefully and deliver quickly. China supports
Rwandan business people by inviting them to
China for official visits, providing them with
entry and facilities at Chinese trade fairs, and
disseminating information to Chinese buyers
about products available from Rwanda.
Despite these challenges, trade between China
and Rwanda promises to grow, diversify and
provide benefits to both parties. Even though the
balance of trade favours China, Rwandans
benefit from access to low-cost consumer goods
and Rwandan businesses gain from access to low-
cost production machinery. Meanwhile, China
gains access to buyers and minerals, and current
efforts to improve Rwandan agriculture could
also lead to food imports in the future.
China’s engagement with Rwanda 
China’s engagement with Rwanda is predicated
on the principles of non-interference and the
One China Policy, and focuses on the mutual
benefits both countries can gain through trade,
investment and economic cooperation. China
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provides aid to Rwanda through Economic and
Technical Cooperation (ETC), but there has
been a shift towards providing official loans with
government-subsidised interest rates and
developing joint ventures between Chinese and
Rwandan companies (Mohan and Power 2008).
FDI projects can often resemble ETC because
they are secured by official bilateral agreements,
do not result in Chinese ownership of assets in
Rwanda, and do not pose any significant
financial risks to the Chinese companies involved
(Kariuki et al. 2009).
China does not have a central aid agency and
considers much information about its aid to be a
state secret, so it is difficult to quantify.
Rwanda’s Official Development Assistance
Report does not include figures from China,
India or Arab Funds because they are not
captured in the Development Assistance
Database. Still, these partners finance only 8 per
cent of Rwanda’s budget. Rwanda estimates that
China’s aid has totalled US$146 million since
1971, being composed of about half in grants,
one-third zero-interest loans, and one-fifth
through preferential loans (Ministry of Finance
and Economic Planning n.d.).
China’s assistance is outlined in the external
assistance budget put together by the Ministry of
Finance and authorised by the National People’s
Congress. Ministries with jurisdiction over
specific kinds of assistance oversee aid that falls
in their domain (education, finance, health,
science and technology and so forth) The
Department of Foreign Aid in MOFCOM is
responsible for aid policy and supervising
implementation, as well as managing bids by
Chinese companies for overseas projects
(Kariuki et al. 2009). It is this body that
administers grants and interest-free loans that
are given to Rwanda, as well as the Export-
Import Bank of China (China EximBank) under
the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MOFA).
To access Chinese aid, Rwanda must approach
one of these authorities to negotiate the terms
and conditions. Then, the two countries reach an
economic and technical cooperation agreement
(essentially a line of credit) against which the
Rwandan government suggests projects. Chinese
teams then carry out feasibility studies and plans
and submit them to the relevant Rwandan
ministry for approval. Each project must comply
with the following criteria:
z Assurance of technical feasibility and
economic viability;
z Generation of social benefits;
z Selection of Chinese companies as the
principal contractor or exporter;
z Procurement of no less than 50 per cent of
equipment, materials, services, or technology
from China;
z Advance procurement of local funds,
equipment or labour needed for the project.
By mandating the use of Chinese firms and
materials, these grants, interest-free or
concessional loans to Rwanda are forms of tied
assistance (Kariuki et al. 2009). In fact, 60–80 per
cent of projects are assigned to Chinese
companies selected by the EximBank and
MOFCOM and then sanctioned by the Rwandan
government (Alden and Alves 2009). China does
this to help facilitate entry of Chinese products
to Rwandan markets and also to help its
companies gain the competitive edge they need
to succeed in international trade.
The terms of Chinese loans are negotiated by
joint permanent commissions that are
established to represent the interests of both
countries. This process includes the signature of
an intergovernmental framework agreement,
which defines the purpose, amount, maturity and
interest rate of the loan as well as the signing of
a loan agreement. Loans from China EximBank
usually include a 35 per cent grant component.
Interest rates vary from 1.25 per cent to 3 per
cent, and the grace period is between five and
eight years, with repayment over 10–20 years
(Alden and Alves 2009). The capital is disbursed
in successive portions, released against project
benchmarks and paid directly to Chinese
companies through the EximBank.
The Department of Foreign Economic
Cooperation regulates Chinese companies
operating overseas. Although in the past Chinese
firms were closely in line with the state’s agenda,
they now have some relative autonomy, although
ties between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
and large Chinese multinationals are still strong.
However, smaller private Chinese firms that are
independent of the Chinese agenda have also
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been encouraged (Mohan and Power 2008).
Furthermore, Chinese construction firms that
traditionally relied upon state-financed projects
have branched out and are now bidding
competitively for publicly tendered
infrastructure projects (Alden and Alves 2009).
Provincial and local governments, which have
been given greater authority to pursue economic
policy abroad since the 1980s, are also actively
promoting their companies’ interests and
investments in Africa (ibid.).
In 2007 China created the China–Africa
Development Fund, which aims to encourage
Chinese firms to invest in Africa in order to
expand their market share, reach consumers and
secure access to resources. It reduces the risk of
investing in African countries for Chinese firms
by providing financial support and advice.
However, the fund requires African partners to
put up a minimum of US$5 million for joint
ventures, which is difficult for most Rwandan
entrepreneurs (Rwanda Focus 2008).
The Chinese Embassy in Rwanda also plays an
important role in maintaining and enhancing the
relationship between the two countries. It hosts
cultural events and celebrations to mark
important dates and foster goodwill between
China and Rwanda. It also has an economic
counsellor’s office attached to it, which helps
connect Rwandan and Chinese business people.
6 Conclusions
A significant aspect of China’s approach to
governance is the changing relations of state and
business in China and its interplay in Africa.
These relationships are quite disorganised at
present, but there is growing pressure to develop
them institutionally to make China’s
intervention in Africa more effective. The
diversification of Chinese actors (and hence
diverse interests) has made it very difficult for it
to define its core interests in Africa.
As China’s role has grown in Africa, so too have
the number and range of government ministries
and agencies, with over 20 of these now actively
involved. This has given rise to constant
administrative power struggles and inter-
departmental dialogue and negotiation.
Interviewees subtly hinted that this is reflected
in relations between the Consular and Embassy
sections in China’s diplomatic missions in Africa.
However, the broad characteristic of Chinese
engagement in Africa remains the same. It is
based on the premise of equality among
sovereign states and the idea of some kind of
transnational governance standard contradicts
the essentially reciprocal and horizontal nature
of the relationship. No one stands in a position of
authority over the other. If typical characteristics
associated with governance, such as
transparency, participation, openness and the
rule of law, are to mean that China is expected
to ensure that they are implemented, that would
contradict the fundamental principles just
outlined. Such concepts are regarded as highly
ethnocentric in character being regarded as
value-laden and culturally-based within Western
societal norms. Instead, as several interviewees
argued, ‘Governance is basically a Western
concept, we Chinese believe in Government, not
governance.’
For example, under the terms of the DRC’s 2008
agreement with China, a major part of its public
affairs management is committed to the goals of
the development projects and cannot be diverted
for either short-term, populist, or even corrupt
goals, through transient local political pressure.
As for damage caused to the environment, that
was to be understood and accepted in the context
of China’s contribution to infrastructure and to
the need to accept some inevitable fallout of
major natural resource development. The
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other
UN specialised agencies are not impartial bodies
in their criticism of an agreement like this
between China and the DRC.
Claims for good governance in mining affect the
contours taken in implementing the initial
Sino–Congolese cooperation programme. The
Congolese government renegotiated and
reshaped the Chinese contract. However, as one
interviewee said:
Quarrels and pronouncements in favour of governance
in an economy experiencing a manifest deficiency in
viable players to boost the economy seem premature. In
a global world, preaching good governance without
investing significantly in improving the economy by
dynamic and daring actors is not sustainable.
The access to decent income seems a better way
to enhance individual capabilities together with
improving the living conditions of populations.
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The DRC currently receives some good returns
from Chinese cooperation by strengthening its
infrastructure, potentially benefiting the whole
economy. However, the weak link in this deal is
the limited technology and know-how transfer by
the Chinese in favour of their own structures and
its own population. Local civil engineering
companies disappear, public agencies such as the
Roads Office, the Office of Urban Roads and
Canalization and the Office for Country Roads
are bogged down and under-equipped. They are
not firmly funded to take over to continue the
maintenance of these infrastructures and
China’s ‘key in hands’ approach in infrastructure
delivery certainly carries quick positive political
dividends. But like a sleeping remedy, it delays or
limits Congolese ownership. It appears to help,
but does not help enough or necessarily always
for the better. Respect for the diplomatic
principle of non-intervention in Congolese affairs
displayed by the Chinese side may not remain for
long in relation to the balance of forces placing
China at the forefront of economic intervention
in the Congo. The apprehension is that a state
cannot have so much potential and latent power
and not use it, even in a discreet manner.
As the Rwandan experience indicates, the
initiative is with the African country to decide
when, where and how it wants development.
China merely responds to requests and then
endeavours to ensure that the participation it
affords is effective. China itself is not responsible
for whether the African side can mount sufficient
civil or multilevel partners at sufficient levels to
benefit fully from this exercise. Nor can China
magically increase the African capacity to absorb
technological transfer beyond the African
capacity for its reception.
The Chinese literature and interviewees argue
that, without elaborating a full theory, they are
concerned with effective governance, with
rebuilding real capacities, with pragmatic
engagement with practical partners on the
ground and with long-term partnerships,
stretching over generations rather than just for
the lifetime of a limited economic project. Here
the governing idea is building capacities, a
participative approach to rebuilding
infrastructure. This resonates with the argument
that overcoming state fragility requires state
resilience, without which good governance
cannot be effective.
At the same time, the Chinese government’s
command of its own business society and that
society’s extension into Africa is not something
over which it has clear direction. The Chinese
officials and academics interviewed concur in the
view that government–business relationships are
currently fluid. There are opportunities for
China’s public and private sectors to build
constructive relationships that contribute to both
Chinese and African development goals.
However, during the fieldwork interviews, it was
evident that business and NGO interviewees
held a very different view from the Chinese
government about how this might happen. Quite
often they criticised the Chinese government
and referred explicitly to the ‘distant
relationship between them and the government
– the gap between the policy and the practice in
Africa.’ For example, in practice, the Chinese
management of projects is not a straightforward,
linear process of implementing a project plan but
is a dynamic, non-deterministic process of
improvisational actors continually shaping and
reshaping practices, with unexpected and
sometimes contradictory effects. This pattern of
behaviour reflects both the lack of
comprehensive direction of economic policy from
Beijing, but also – especially with respect to the
Western ideology of governance as participation
by a wide range of transnational actors – that the
constant Chinese search is for real talent on the
ground which can be translated into effective
action; effective in the sense of achieving the
goals of the particular Chinese actor. This may
well mean keeping a great deal of activity in
Chinese hands.
In other words, it is not really practicable, given
the fluidity of business–government relations
among the Chinese, whether at home or in Africa
– to be trying to address some ideologically-driven
concepts of governance to Chinese political
authorities. Not merely do they reject this in
principle, because of their philosophy of diplomatic
relations with African states, but the actual
practice of economic activity by the Chinese in
Africa, whether state-owned companies or
private companies, is not being directed by any
central authority according to any single plan.
The processes of economic activity set in motion
since the middle of the first decade of the century
are too complex to have an overview, unless one
wants to fall back on the very Western view of
neoliberal laissez-faire, that so many hyper-
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dynamic individual actors are spontaneously
propelled to be disciplined by a Western theory
of governance, which must, in any case, be
implemented by states since it is a public not a
private belief system. In other words, the whole
Western demand that China should as a state
contribute to good governance in Africa is so
riddled with contradiction, in terms also of Western
ideology of the market, as to make no sense.
It is not surprising, therefore, to find that
Chinese interviewees believe that progress in
development in Africa is clearly dependent on
Africans themselves, not outside partners. This is
one of the findings to emerge most clearly from
the China interviews. Outsiders should continue
to adhere to the principle of at least ‘doing no
harm’, and could help if their motives and
approaches were right. But they were not the
main drivers of what would happen. Change had
to come from within. The Chinese are frequently
aware of deficits of political stabilisation, if not
legitimacy on the African side. However, the
Chinese themselves believe they are hardly in a
position to contribute to resolving this from their
own domestic experience.
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